La riforma necessaria *

L’impegno preso a Lisbona di fare dell’Europa la più competitiva economia del mondo basata sulla conoscenza richiede un profondo ripensamento del sistema universitario. Da fondare su tre punti chiave. Una maggiore competitività tra università basata sulla reputazione, un autogoverno degli atenei in linea con gli obiettivi della società e una struttura di incentivi che sappia premiare l’impegno dei docenti. In tutto ciò resta decisivo il ruolo del settore pubblico

Tutti concordano sul fatto che l’università in Europa sia a un punto di svolta, e che una profonda riforma sia necessaria. Due iniziative avviate al più alto livello politico in Europa spingono in questa direzione: il processo di Bologna e la dichiarazione di Lisbona del 2000, quando il Consiglio europeo espresse la volontà di fare dell’Europa la più competitiva economia del mondo basata sulla conoscenza (obiettivo da raggiungere entro il 2010 si disse allora. Il che lo rende molto improbabile, mi accontenterei del 2015). La seconda iniziativa pone un’enfasi decisamente maggiore sulla ricerca, un elemento che mancava nella prima e che solo recentemente, con la formazione dei dottorandi, è divenuto una parte importante del processo.

There is general agreement that the European university is at a crossroad and that reform is necessary.

There are, at least, two major European-level policy initiatives pushing in that direction: the Bologna process and the Lisbon 2000 declaration of the Executive Council of the EU expressing the will of Europe to become the most competitive knowledge based economy in the world (by the year 2010, which is most unlikely. I would happily settle for 2015). The second initiative has a strong emphasis on research, which the fist initially lacked. It has only recently been added, with doctoral education, as an important ingredient of the process.

The Lisbon commitment implies that the European space of higher education recognizes itself in the ambition to became as good, or even better, than the American one. It is a tall order: the latter is very good. It is obvious therefore that there is much to be learned from the USA.

Yet the real challenge is how to become as good as the USA and how to adapt many positive experiences from the USA without postulating an impossible reality: that Europe becomes (socially, economically, culturally, linguistically) like the USA.

For many decades Europe will remain much more segmented than the USA.
From general to particular one could specify three key domains for reform measures:
(i) The structure of the inter-relationship among universities (“the market”) has to be efficiency promoting.
(ii) The objectives and aims of the management structure of individual universities have to be aligned with the social interest and the goal of efficiency.
(iii) Individual academics has to be well motivated and engaged. Incentives are therefore very important.

I comment in turn for each of these aspects.
I will admit to the prejudice of thinking that a higher level of competition among European universities would be healthy. Transforming the field of higher education into a conventional market (with educational services as commodities) would go too far. Not even in the USA is this seriously entertained as a general option. But generating competition for students based (this is important) on reputation effects seems the right way to go. Incidentally, it is very likely – and there is nothing wrong in that – that a true European, interconnected and competitive field of higher education develops first at the postgraduate level. Presumably the European segmentation phenomenon will be dominant at the undergraduate level for quite sometime.

Universities tend to be self-governing institutions. There are both sound and historical reasons for that. Self-government is a characteristic that has to be preserved. Yet, this does not mean neither that all forms of self-government are equivalent nor that a self-governing university will have its decisions automatically aligned with the social objectives. There are distortions and although a funding public authority could try to get around those by means of contracts, most likely it will fail at this because the discretionary margin available to a public agency for the imposition of an effective stick- and-carrots policy is, most likely, too narrow. With the education of the young at stake threats involving large punishments will lack credibility. Thus, even taking into account the conditioning of the funding agencies, the extent of self-government by universities is considerable. Its decisions (or non-decisions) are made with the participation (often with the blocking power) of a large portfolio of internal interest groups. The consequence of all this was well put by Burton Clark: “Traditional European Universities have long exhibited a notoriously weak capacity to steer themselves”. The contrast with American universities is here striking.

The third issue I have referred to are incentives. With very qualified personnel, embodying much human capital, effort is of the essence and therefore so are the incentive schemes for the academic personnel. Professors typically produce teaching and research services. One often heard criticism in Europe is that we tend to give more incentives for research than for teaching. I have no quarrel with the research incentives (good researchers have many outside options) but I would agree with a policy of increasing incentives for teaching under one condition. To wit: that personnel be initially chosen by research talent, or promise. Simplifying beyond reason one could say that good teaching is fundamentally, and for most people, a matter more of effort than of talent. The contrary is the case for research. Incidentally, a particular type of incentive measure is tenure. The possibility of tenure is a positive characteristic of university institutions (it exists even in the USA) and one that, in all likelihood, competition will preserve. Yet one can question if the form of tenure represented by a civil service position – a situation common in Europe – is the best one.

I conclude with a more political question: in European university matters, who are the more likely agents of change?. With some trepidation I dare to say that it is not likely that this role will be played, especially in the earlier steps, by the universities themselves. What about the private and non-government sector? It may have a positive influence as there may be exemplary, privately promoted, developments that are then widely imitated. But the influence is necessarily limited as the European private sector does not have a history of providing funds for higher education comparable to the USA model. What then? It remains the public sector, and indeed once everything said and done, it seems to me that the role of public policy in pursuing the aim of in-depth university reform will need to be paramount.